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Abstract
Ethical issues involved in the design of the “PROPATRIA” probiotica
trial are discussed. This randomized clinical trial appeared to be well
conducted according to accepted good practices. The finding that
the treatment was actually rather harmful, and that despite this, and
despite a built-in interim analysis, the trial was not stopped earlier,
led to strong criticism in the media.
I argue that “accepted good practices” need to be reconsidered
in the light of this experience. Firstly, a much stronger distinction
needs to be recognized between the immediate interests of the patients
being treated in the trial, and the interests of future patients of future
doctors elsewhere. Secondly, it is in the interests of future patients
that well conducted clinical trials are accepted by society. Since it
is unavoidable that an occasional trial will result in an unpredicted
severely negative outcome, ethical screening committees must ensure
that those performing a trial can never be accused of putting the
interest of “science” above the interest of their own patients when
such “accidents” happen.
There are two consequences of this. Firstly, the design of a trial
should also explicitly minimize the number of patients who are treated
by the researchers with a potentially seriously harmful medicine. Sec-
ondly, the disadvantages of triple-blinding far outweigh the advan-
tages. Though it might at best only have saved a few lives if the
PROPATRIA trial been re-designed with these issues in mind, I argue
that the scientific value of the trial would not have been significantly
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reduced; the damage to medical research, and hence to future patients,
would have been substantially less.
Closer inspection of the data from the PROPATRIA trial brings
a new and quite unexpected failing to light. The decision for early
stopping the trial was accidentally based on the one-sided test looking
in the wrong direction, partly through inadequacy of the output of the
statistical package SPSS, partly through lack of statistical expertise
on the part of the users. If the envisaged one-sided stopping rule had
been used correctly, the trial would in fact have been terminated at
the time of the interim analysis “for futility”: it was at this moment
highly unlikely that a significant end-result in favour of probiotica was
going to be attained. The decision to continue the trial was a result
of looking at the test statistic “in the wrong direction”. In effect, the
trial was continued because there was still a good chance to show that
probiotica is actually very harmful.
I recommend that data monitoring committees should always be
advised by a professional statistician and that this person is not blinded
to the treatment allocation.
1 The Design
The recently concluded PROPATRIA study of the use of probiotics in the
treatment of acute pancreatitis (Besselink et al., 2004, 2008) received much
media attention in the Netherlands when it was revealed at the close of the
study that the treatment appeared to have a negative effect. It did not, as
expected, decrease the chance of infectious complications, which remained at
around 1 in 3. More seriously, among those that did develop infectious com-
plications, the frequency of a fatal outcome was roughly doubled (roughly,
from 1 in 4 to 1 in 2).
For ethical reasons the multi-centre, doubled-blinded, randomized trial
had been monitored over the the three years of its duration, and an interim
analysis performed. The interim analysis was further semi-blinded in the
sense that the monitoring committee did not know which group was the
treatment group, which group was the control. Though, at the final conclu-
sion of the trial, there had been a total of 33 deaths in the total group of 296
patients considered in the final analysis, only two of these deaths had been
considered by doctors in the participating hospitals as so unexpected and
serious at the time, that they were reported individually to the monitoring
committee. The treatment group was revealed to the monitoring committee
for those two cases only. In both cases the patient was in the treatment
group; and in both cases the death was due to the same rather unusual com-
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plication which – only retrospectively – turned out to be the cause of a large
number of the probiotica deaths.
The research team conducting the trial certainly strongly believed at the
outset that probiotica likely would have a good effect on their patients. They
had theoretical arguments supporting that opinion, and also empirical evi-
dence pointing in the good direction (but there have also been negative re-
ports). Moreover, the treatment consists of a cocktail of bacteria which,
among healthy people, are normal and necessary residents of our digestive
tract, and which are present in popular and commercially available food ad-
ditives. New strains had been developed which were expected to stimulate
immune response, and to compete with the “bad” bacteria associated with
the infectious complications which are the usual cause of mortality in pan-
creatitis. The researchers considered that there were good reasons to carry
out a large scale trial to settle the issue, and did not expect any negative
consequences of the treatment.
In retrospect, the triple blinding of the study is obviously an embarras-
ment to the already seriously disappointed and concerned researchers. This
is especially the case since the trial was originally planned to include only 200
patients, not 3001. At the interim analysis of the first 100, the overall rate of
infectious complication was lower than expected. The monitoring committee
made the recomendation to increase the total intake to 300 patients “in order
to preserve statistical power”. This is an intervention on behalf of science,
not on behalf of the patients in the trial, as I will further argue below. The
formal interim analysis was postponed to the new, expected, half-way mark,
but actually only took place when the treatment of a total of 184 patients
had been completed. The mortality of the two groups seemed different but
the difference did not quite reach significance at the 10% level. The moni-
toring committee associated this with a slight difference in the initial health
state of the two groups; and the monitoring committee did not know which
group was which. Presumably, if anything they could imagine that the trial
was working out – to the advantage of the treatment – as the researchers had
initially expected. An early stopping rule based on the “primary endpoint”
of the trial, infectious complications, seemed to indicate that the trial should
continue.
The statistical design was based on mostly standard recipes distilled from
1Actually: 298 patients entered the trial, but in retrospect, it appeared 2 had been
wrongly diagnosed and are removed from the analysis. The final report says that the
monitoring committee advised increasing to 296. I wonder if the monitors really wrote
this number, or if it was a slip of the pen of the final reporter, two years later. Whether
this is exactly the number which came out of a calculation or not, I replace it here by a
round number
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a standard work – at least, locally, in the Netherlands — Schouten (1999).
That author highly recommends the interim analysis advised by Snapinn
(1992). A small poll of professors of medical statistics in the Netherlands
revealed that despite Schouten’s endorsement, this method is more or less
forgotten. Internationally the methods of choice seem to be those of Pocock,
and of Fleming and O’Brien. However The Lancet follows Sir Richard Peto’s
much more radical advice only to act on interim analysis significance tests
if they reach the 1 in 1000 significance level: in other words, almost never.
There is a good philosophy behind this recommendation, but it is based on
assumptions, and the question is always, whether those assumptions ought
to have been made in this case, even if they might be usually uncontroversial.
Triple blinding is very controversial, and is much discussed in the litera-
ture. The FDA extensively discuss the pros and cons in their guidelines for
clinical trials in drug testing, and advises against it. A Dutch epidemiologist
Vandenbroucke (1999) endorses it strongly in a three page article in the Ned-
erlands Tijdschrift voor de Geneeskunde. He gives good reasons for it, but
there are also reasons against it, and the question is, what is most relevant
for this specific case. Normal practice in the US and the UK is that even
if the data monitoring committee is blinded, the statistician who is advising
them is not blinded. He or she is able to intervene if the committee seems
to be making a decision which they would regret if the identity of the two
groups were exchanged. Normal practice is that the data monitoring com-
mittee explicitly plays through both scenarios in their deliberations: group
A is treatment, B is control; and vice versa. If their decision under both
scenarios is the same the data does not need to be de-blinded.
In the paper Besselink et al. (2004) describing the design of the trial in
BMC Surgery, the researchers write
This study is conducted in accordance with the principles of the
Declaration of Helsinki and ‘good clinical practice’.
For ethical reasons it is desirable to end a therapeutic experi-
ment once a statistical significant difference in treatment results
has been reached. This study uses the stopping-rules according to
Snapinn (1992). An interim-analysis will be performed after the
data of the first 100 patients (50% fraction) is obtained. Accord-
ing to Snappin, the trial will be ended at this interim-analysis at
p < 0.0081. The study will also be ended in case of adverse events
without possibility of positive outcome, p > 0.382. The monitor-
ing committee will discuss the results of the interim-analysis and
advice the steering committee. The steering committee decides
on the continuation of the trial.
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Now, there are certainly ethical reasons to conclude a trial as soon as
possible. Schouten (1999) gives a list of four ethical concerns (and more can
be added):
1. Is it ethical to give a placebo treatment to a seriously ill person?
2. Is it ethical to give an untested new medicine, which might have serious
side effects, to a seriously ill person?
3. Is it ethical to decide treatment for a seriously ill patient, with the
interests of science in mind, on the basis of tossing a coin?
4. Is it ethical still not to know, 10 or 20 years from now, what is the best
treatment for a seriously ill patient?
The point I want to make is that different ethical concerns are in conflict
with one another. Any proposed “solution” implictly weights the different
concerns in a particular way.
Let me first sketch the global design of the trial. It was set up to have
power 0.80 when testing the null hypothesis of no treatment effect, two sid-
edly, and with significance level 0.05, against the alternative that the treat-
ment roughly halved the probability of the “primary endpoint”, infectious
complications. This means that the primary constraint on the researchers
is to guard against the publication of “false positives”. They mustn’t run a
higher risk than 1 in 20 of this. And journals which publish the results of
medical research, insist on the same “filtering” of signal from noise.
Since the power against the actually expected effect is 0.80, they are
prepared to run a risk of 1 in 5 that the treatment cannot be proved effective,
even if it is exactly as effective as they believe. It is perhaps hard to believe
that one invests so much research effort with a 1 in 5 chance that it is all
wasted, but this seems to be standard practice. On the other hand, one could
say that taking such a low sample size is actually protecting patients, in the
case that the new treatment turns out to be bad for them.
Whose ethical concerns are addressed by these choices? Primarily, the
concerns of science and of future patients of future doctors. We don’t want
to tell the world that probiotica is fantastic, when actually it does nothing.
(And The Lancet won’t let us do this either). There is an unpleasant side
effect here: if probiotica actually doubles the risk of infectious outcomes,
instead of halving it, we also run a risk of 1 in 5 of not noticing that, and
just getting a non-significant result. At least, a false-positive result does not
get published in that case either. Would The Lancet have published a non-
significant result anyway? It is surely bad to tell the world that probiotica
makes no difference, when it actually doubles your risk.
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Now let us overlay these, already ethical choices, with the choice implied
by Snapinn’s method.
The reason Schouten is so enthusiastic about Snapinn is that it does not
alter the evaluation of the final results when the trial is not stopped half-
way. Thus the nominal size α = 0.05 is maintained, even though there is
some chance that the sample size is half what it apparently should have
been.
There are no free lunches. This means that either the power is reduced,
or the chance to stop early hardly exists.
Well, we have to be a bit more careful, since the chance of early stopping
depends on “the truth”. Snapinn is conservative, and does not want to lose
much power. There is some chance of early stopping if the null hypothesis
is true, but almost no chance of early stopping if the alternative hypothesis
is true. Thus the power is only slightly reduced. Schouten has adapted
Snapinn’s design, and accepts a much larger loss of power in order to increase
the chances of early stopping, under both hypotheses.
Whose ethical concerns are addressed by use of this early stopping rule?
Clearly it is good to stop early if probiotica doesn’t do anything at all (though
whether The Lancet would still publish if the trial is aborted halfway because
nothing is expected to come of it, is an interesting question). What about
the issues of interest to the patients actually entering the trial? If a new
treatment has unpleasant side effects but otherwise makes no difference, then
the patients who would normally enter the trial later, would appreciate not
receiving it. It’s a bit strange to call the “secondary outcome” death, merely
an unpleasant side effect.
And how big is the chance of stopping early, if the treatment has no effect
at all? The answer is easy to read off, from the actual implementation of
the Snapinn rule: the researchers planned to stop the trial half-way, if the
p-value at that time was larger than 0.382. This means that there was a 62%
chance that the trial would be stopped half-way if actually the treatment
did not reduce infectious complications (as indeed seems to be the case). If
the treatment has a negative effect, the probability of stopping early “for
futility” rapidly gets larger. So at this point the trial does have a built-in
safety measure.
Whose ethical concerns are addressed by adopting Vandenbroucke’s ad-
vice to triple blind? This makes it even less likely for a monitoring committee
to “break the rules” by stopping the trial early when it is going in an unex-
pected, negative direction. The point is that future patients of future doctors
have an interest in trials being completed to full term, otherwise results are
biased. A trial which is stopped early because of an apparent negative effect
is probably stopped when the observed (negative) effect is worse than the
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actual one.
In conclusion: ethical safeguards were built into the statistical design of
the trial, but they are a variety safety measures for different, conflicting, eth-
ical issues. Some safety measures actually increase the ethical dangers in the
situation which by the admission of the researchers themselves, most likely
obtained for the probiotica trial – namely testing a treatment which turned
out to be harmful for their patients. For this eventuality, just one statistical
safety measure was built in – the possibility of “stopping for futility” in the
Snapinn plan.
2 The Results
In their 2008 publication in The Lancet at the close of the trial, the re-
searchers write
We calculated that 200 patients with predicted severe acute pan-
creatitis would be required to detect a 20% reduction in the abso-
lute risk of the occurrence of infectious complications (from 50%
to 30% of patients during admission and 90-day follow-up) for
the study to attain an 80% statistical power, at a two-sided α of
0.05. This sample size calculation took into account the fact that
up to 40% of patients with predicted severe pancreatitis are ulti-
mately diagnosed with mild pancreatitis (i.e., no local or systemic
complications) and thus do not progress to severe or necrotising
pancreatitis. After the first 100 patients were randomised and
had completed follow-up, the number of infectious complications
was calculated in the total group.
The rate of infectious complications was lower than expected
(28%), so the monitoring committee advised increasing the to-
tal sample size from 200 to 296 patients to maintain statistical
power. After 184 patients had been randomised and had com-
pleted follow-up, a blinded interim analysis was done for the pri-
mary endpoint and mortality. Although a non-signicant differ-
ence in mortality was observed (p = 0.10), the monitoring com-
mittee concluded that this had been caused by skewed randomi-
sation because more patients in the group with higher mortality
required admission to intensive care within 72 hours after admis-
sion (p = 0.15), whereas the overall mortality was well within the
expected range (11%). According to the predefined stopping rule
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the monitoring committee recommended that the study should
be completed.
During the study, two serious adverse events were reported; both
patients died. The monitoring committee convened on both oc-
casions: in one patient, a ruptured caecum with ischaemia was
found during emergency laparotomy and the second patient had
small-bowel ischaemia diagnosed at emergency laparotomy. In
both cases, the randomisation code was broken (both patients
had received probiotics). This information was revealed only to
members of the monitoring and steering committees. A review
of published work did not reveal any evidence of a relation be-
tween bowel ischaemia and the use of probiotics. The monitoring
committee subsequently advised that the study continue. The
institutional review board was informed on both occasions.
I want to draw attention to two things: firstly, the advice of the moni-
toring committee to increase the sample size in order to maintain statistical
power. Actually, this possibility was envisaged in the original protocol of
the trial, for the following reason. Patients had to be entered into the trial
on the basis of predicted severe acute pancreatitis. It takes another week or
more before a more certain diagnosis can be made, but it was important to
start the treatment straight away. It could be that many patients were being
admitted who in retrospect only had mild acute pancreatitis. In that case, a
bigger sample size would be needed to see the same effect on those patients
with severe acute pancreatitis.
This means that the data monitoring committee was authorized to inter-
vene in the design of the trial, for ethical reasons concerned with the treat-
ment of future patients of future doctors, not with the treatment of their
own patients in their own trial. They were authorized to make decisions
about the future treatment of patients about to enter the trial, based on the
results of the trial so far, without knowing which group was the treatment
group and which group was the control group. It seems that the monitor-
ing committee dealt with this problem by looking at the aggregate data of
the two treatment groups. When they did this, they saw a much lower rate
of infectious complications overall, than had been expected in advance, and
hence concluded that there were more patients with only mild pancreatitis
in the trial than planned. Simultaneously the monitoring committee saw the
same overall mortality rate as had been expected in advance! It seems to me
that an alarm bell might have gone off here. The monitoring committee does
not know that the excess deaths – not statistically significant, to be sure –
are occurring in the treatment group! Despite the conflicting information,
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and blinded to the identity of the two groups, they proposed increasing the
sample size.
Secondly, the application of Snapinn’s rule talks about adverse events.
Yet only two adverse events were ever investigated by the monitoring com-
mittee. Only two adverse events were “serious”. Both two serious adverse
events were connected to the same complication. A literature search did not
connect this kind of event to probiotica. What if the monitoring committee
had known that already half of the many deaths in the probiotica group were
of this same rare kind? Perhaps the literature search would have been ex-
tended with consultation with experts from other fields. It is now easy, after
the events, to find microbiologists who say in effect “I told you so”.
I think it could have been good if the monitoring committee had talked
to these microbiologists already half-way through the trial.
If the trial had not been triple-blinded, the monitoring committee might
now have pulled the plug on it. Obviously (if the effect which has been found
is real), this would have saved some lives of patients in the trial.
Would science, would future patients of future doctors, have suffered?
In retrospect there are plausible medical explanations for the “new” phe-
nomenon. When your immune system is at breaking point, “stimulating” it
with friendly bacteria is not a good idea. When the barriers between different
organs are breaking down and evil, agressive, bacteria are moving freely from
one place to another, adding new streams of migrants, however useful they
might be in your gut, only makes things worse in places where they ought
not to be.
It seems to this non-medical person, that if half-way the researchers had
seen what was the special complication which was killing the already seriously
ill patients in the treatment group, they could just as well have come up with
this theory half-way already. It seems to this non-medical person, that if
the trial had been stopped half-way, the substantive conclusions of the trial
which now appear in The Lancet could also have been reached and could also
have been told to the world, one way or another. Anyway, if the monitoring
committee found other microbiologists with different ideas, they could have
only temporarily stopped the trial. If it was medically truly believed to be a
false alarm, the trial could have been recontinued after a break.
My point is, that at least they could, even if only in retrospect, have
proved that they did always have the interests of their own patients in mind,
not just the interests of the future patients of future doctors. This would
have made life for them easier now; and it would be to the benefit of future
patients and of science, since clinical trials can only be done if the public
is confident that their doctors always think in the first place of their own
patients.
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3 The stopping rule
As noted above, the PROPATRIA team report that the Snapinn stopping
rule indicated that the trial should continue at the new (postponed) interim
analysis, which actually took place not half-way through the modified trial at
150, but a bit later at 184 patients. It turns out that this conclusion was based
on a mis-reading of the output of a statistical package, and that according
to the protocol of the experiment the trial should have been stopped at that
moment. In order to explain how this happened I need to discuss the stopping
rule in a little more detail, and first of all to repeat the principles on which
it is constructed.
The idea of the Snapinn rule is that a randomized clinical trial comparing
an experimental new treatment to a standard therapy for a life-threatening
medical condition should be stopped early on ethical grounds, in either of
the following situations: (1) it has become overwhelmingly clear that the new
treatment is better than the standard ; (2) it has become overwhelmingly clear
that the trial is not going to show that the new treatment is any better than
the standard. These two situations are called “stopping for significance”
and “stopping for futility”, respectively. The trial is continued in the third
scenario: (3) there is a reasonable chance that the new treatment will finally
turn out to be better than the standard, but we aren’t sure yet.
An explicit possibility of stopping for futility provides an implicit safety
measure: if the new treatment is actually harmful to the patients, we would
want the trial to stop as early as possible. But this situation would also tend
to result in data such that the trial is stopped early “for futility”.
The PROPATRIA team used an adaptation due to Schouten (1999, stan-
dard Dutch textbook Klinische Statistiek) of the early-stopping-rule of Snap-
inn (1992, Statistics in Medicine). The key feature of this early-stopping rule
is that it is based on the p-value of the statistic of interest, at the time of
the interim analysis. “Time” is expressed as the fraction of the originally
planned sample size, at which one is performing the interim analysis. One
should simply compare the interim p-value to two critical values, one for
stopping for signficance, the other for stopping for futility. The critical val-
ues are determined from the over-all intended significance level and power,
and the interim sample fraction (time). Snapinn’s procedure is carefully de-
signed such that the overall significance level of the trial with early stopping
allowed is the same as the significance level of the trial with fixed sample
size. Moreover, if the trial is not stopped early, the statistical analysis at the
end of the trial is the same as if early stopping had not been incorporated
in the design at all. Because the trial might stop early and the significance
level is unaltered, some power is lost. Snapinn, and following him Schouten,
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have tuned the thresholds for early stopping in a compromise between loss of
power and chance of stopping early. Schouten allows a bigger loss of power,
hence increases the chance of stopping early.
As just mentioned, the data monitoring committee was blinded to the
identity of treatment groups A and B. This means that they needed to com-
pute the one-sided p-value for testing the null hypothesis of no treatment
effect against the alternative of a beneficial treatment effect, with both as-
signments of “treatment” and “control” to groups A and B. The outcome is
binary (infectious complications or not) and the researchers used the Fisher
exact test for a 2×2 contingency table. In that context, the statistical pack-
age SPSS does not allow the user to specify which one-sided alternative is of
interest, but reports the p-value for the one-sided test which is more signifi-
cant; i.e., that of the alternative suggested post-hoc by the data. Apparently,
the committee did not realise what was going on. The p-value delivered by
SPSS did not depend on the labelling of the two groups.
But what was it? Though the PROPATRIA researchers declined to pro-
vide the data from the interim analyses to interested scientists, they did ac-
cidentally provide some data to interested journalists at a press-conference.
The two groups are labelled there as group A and group B. From the snip-
pets of information about the interim analysis available in the Lancet paper,
we can determine that group A is the treatment group, and group B is the
placebo or control group. To my great surprise it turns out that at the in-
terim analysis, the rate of infectious complications (the primary endpoint)
in group A exceeded that in group B by an absolute amount of 5%. Nor-
malizing with an estimate of the of the standard deviation of the difference,
yields a z-value of close to +1. Thus the one-sided p-value for the alternative
that probiotica is bad for you is about 16%; the one-sided p-value for the
alternative that probiotica is good for you is about 84%.
The Fisher exact test gives similar p-values of 21% and 87% respectively.
The data monitoring committee obtained from SPSS, for both cases, the
smaller p-value of 21%. Comparison with the critical values from Snapinn-
Schouten leads to the advice “continue” in both cases. There is no need to
de-blind the data. However the appropriate p-value was 87% and the proper
conclusion was to stop the experiment for futility.
In order to obtain the correct decision it would have been necessary to
de-blind. The data monitoring committee would then not only have received
a signal from the Snapinn rule that it was pointless to continue the trial, the
rate of infectious complications in the treatment group was actually larger
than in the control group and there was almost no chance that this could
reverse by the end of the trial; they would also have seen that the mortality
was also much larger in the treatment group than in the control group.
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The fact that the researchers did not realise that anything was wrong
indicates some lack of understanding of the principles behind the statistical
methods they were using. There are some other indications of inadequate
understanding, though to be fair, both Snapinn and Schouten-on-Snapinn
are difficult reading. At the same time, it is very difficult to trace exactly
what they did do: the publications of the probiotica group always refer to
Snapinn (1992) without further specification. Snapinn gives three versions
of this stopping rules, Schouten gives two more. The critical values quoted
by the researchers cannot be found in Snapinn’s paper at all. Now, Schouten
made several innovations. He allows a greater chance of early stopping, at
the cost of decrease of power. While Snapinn throughout works with a one-
sided significance level of 2.5%, Schouten uses throughout 5%. There is a
good reason for Snapinn’s choice. He wants to graft his carefully constructed
asymmetric early stopping rule onto a fixed sample size final evaluation with
the conventional two-sided significance level of 5%. Maybe in an instinctive
correction for Schouten’s inappropriate doubling of the significance level, the
probiotica researchers took critical values corresponding to halving the error
of the second kind: so together, they got their critical values from the table
for one-sided 5% significance level and power 90%, instead of the “trial design
parameters” one-sided 2.5% signficance level and power 80%. There is one
more mismatch: the interim analysis had been planned at a sample fraction
of 50%, but in fact only took place at 60%; they should have gone back
to the tables to find the critical values at 60% rather than using those for
50%. However, none of these inaccuracies in the implementation affect the
conclusion which should have followed: stop for futility.
4 Optimal group sequential designs
Jennison and Turnbull (2002) provide methodology for determining group
sequential plans which minimize the expected sample size for given errors of
the two kinds. In particular one can design a plan with the same errors of
the first and second kinds as the PROPATRIA trial, and which minimizes
the expected sample size when the actual effect of probiotica is the opposite
to that expected a doubling instead of a halving of the rate of infectious
complications. It turns out that under that negative scenario, the expected
sample size is 15% of the fixed sample sample size, with the same size and
power.
However this result is not directly relevant to the PROPATRIA trial
since the rate of infectious complications, the primary endpoint of the trial,
was hardly affected by the treatment. Since infectious complications are the
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major cause of death in acute pancreatitis, and since deaths of some other
causes also turned out to be increased by the treatment, in retrospect it
would have been wise to take the primary endpoint of the trial as death from
the disease. Now, the expected death rate was 10%, and the researchers
presumably expected this too to be halved by their treatment, while in fact
it was doubled. Because of the lower rate, the fixed sample size required
for two-sided size 5% and power 80% becomes larger. Still, the final result
is that a group sequential plan designed for early stopping in the case of a
negative effect of the treatment, would have led to this trial being stopped
at about 100 patients.
5 Conclusions
Medical researchers following their hunches and anxious to prove they have
found a fantastic new way to cure patients, pull sophisticated statistical tools
out of the drawer. Using these sophisticated tools helps persuade ethical
screening committees to back them. The standard methods in the standard
textbooks already make ethical assumptions. Routine application of these
methods means one is routinely making those same ethical assumptions. But
I suspect that no-one realises what those ethical assumptions are. And no-
one realises that addressing one ethical concern, might expose you more
seriously to another. In principle mathematical statisticians can figure out
the solutions to the more complicated optimization problems which arise
when you try to take account of more, and conflicting, concerns at the same
time. At least, we can bring these out into the open so everyone knows what
is the cost to “buying” one of the standard solutions.
We could have designed the trial so that it minimized the expected num-
ber of patients entering the trial if the probiotica doubles the risk, subject to
the same size and power. It would have been a completely different design.
Possibly it would not have saved many lives, possibly it was infeasible. But I
think it is important to know whether the researchers could easily have saved
many lives, or if they were already doing close to what is best, even though
they had not primarily concerned themselves with protecting their patients
from a possibly dangerous medicine.
Admittedly a serious complication to any mathematical statistical treat-
ment, is that in this case the treatment had increased the chance of a certain
serious side effect. To be precise, death. So my main recommendation is
not to do some difficult mathematics, but to reappraise the ethics of “triple
blind”. Especially on top of all the other actually rather one-sided ethical
concern embodied in the usual choices of null and alternative, size and power.
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The choice of the Snapinn protocol is one of the few places where the
trial has a built in safety feature: if the treatment is working badly, there
is some chance that “stopping for futility” will be triggered. It is especially
tragic that this safety feature failed to work through a misreading of output
of a statistical package.
My conclusion is that ethical screening committees need more statistical
expertise in order to judge which ethical concerns are being taken account
of, when someone else’s routine and technical “ethical solution” is imple-
mented. Secondly, monitoring committees also need more statistical exper-
tise, in order to correctly implement complex statistical protocols. Thirdly,
if the monitoring committee is blinded to the identity of the treatment and
the control group, they should at least be advised by a person who is not
blinded, in order to ensure that the committee never makes decisions based
on an incorrect guess of which group is which. Finally: it is important to
learn from mistakes.
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